Abstract-With the significant growth in the quantity of cloud storage customers, it becomes a primary issue for cloud storage companies to properly allocate cloud resources among selfish and rational virtual machines (VMs), which compete for resources with others only to maximize their own performance regardless of the overall system equalization. In this paper, a mechanism approach is presented to cope with this problem. Distinguish to previous studies, the proposed approach not only considers storage cost and valuation of user data, but also comprehensively takes the memory of storage nodes, data center CPU and network bandwidth into consideration. Moreover, we design a guidance algorithm to achieve dominant equilibrium of the system. Through theoretical analysis and experiments, the proposed mechanism has proved its effectiveness and incentive compatibility for the overall system equalization. 
The storage allocation strategy is one of the most important problems in cloud storage system. As Virtual Machines (VMs) are selfish and rational, a VM will compete with others to maximize its own profit. This problem brings new challenges to cloud providers who must thwart non-cooperative behavior as well as allocate resources among selfish VMs efficiently. Many re-source allocation works have been done in the past. In [3] , it is pointed that, the growing demand increases the energy consumption of data centers, which translates to high energy cost and high carbon emissions which are not environmentally sustainable, so the strategy pro-posed focus on energy saving. There also exist other storage allocation strategies such as load balancing algorithm [4] and value-based scheduling [5] , whereas most of the existing work focuses on the storage cost to achieve a better storage allocation performance. But they often ignore the importance of the user's data value and synthesized performance metrics of the cloud nodes. Data value represents the importance of data in both users' and cloud providers' perspective. Different values of data should be considered when allocating the cloud storage, in order to maximize the profits while minimizing the impacts on users' quality of services (QoS). In the meantime, considering the unique characteristic of cloud storage system, sophisticated performance metrics, e.g., network bandwidth, CPU and memories, should be taken into consideration when allocating the storage to effectively balance the load of each cloud node, and finally reduce the cost of the entire system. Interestingly, the storage allocation problem is also a specific aspect in the research area of resource allocation, in which many proposed solutions are readily applicable. Resource allocation is one of the most challenging problems in resource management. As a key issue in the research of cloud computing, resource allocation has attracted numerous efforts in both academic and industry societies [6] . Work [7] proposes a reinforcement learning based management system for dynamic allocation of servers, the proposed method tried to maximize the profit of the host data center in cloud computing. A generic request allocation and scheduling scheme was proposed in [8] to achieve desired percentile service level agreements (SLA) goals of consumers and to increase the profits to the cloud provider. Storage allocation is a particular aspect of resource allocation, especially in cloud computing environment, where heterogeneous clusters hinder the efficiency of storage strategy. In [9] , a dynamic storage allocation algorithm was proposed based on the performance of heterogeneous nodes. The proposed algorithm aims at improving the performance of Hadoop. Game-theory based resource allocation mechanisms have also received a considerable amount of attentions to solve the optimization problem of resource allocation in cloud computing environment [10] [11] [12] . Our work differs from the existing methods by considering the selfish behaviors of the cloud node, so that auctionbased method [13] is proposed to achieve the objective of storage allocation in an interactive manner.
Motivated by the observations, in this paper, we propose a mechanism design approach for storage allocation in cloud computing platforms. The proposed method explicitly considers individual VMs' rationality so as to thwart selfish behavior and enforce truthrevealing for selfish VMs. First, we model the cloud storage system according to its massive and heterogeneous nature. Then, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [14] mechanism based storage allocation strategy is pro-posed to solve the storage allocation problem on the basis of storage cost and the valuation of user data, as well as considering various aspects of performance of nodes. The proposed approach can effectively avoid the selfish behavior of cloud node and force the cloud node to truthfully bid on tasks, storage allocation is formed based on the truthful bidding according to each node's performance to maximize the profit of the cloud storage system. We provide extensive theoretical analysis and experimental studies to verify the correctness and efficiency of the proposed strategy. In [15] , the authors proposed a VCG mechanism aiming at load balancing in distributed system, which is similar to our work. The difference is that we focus on system cost rather than load balancing. Our proposed VCG mechanism aims to solve the storage allocation problem on the basis of storage cost and the valuation of user data as well as considering various aspects of performance of nodes. The proposed mechanism achieves incentive compatible and enforces truth-reavling for selfish VMs.
The main contributions of this work are as following: 1) we model the storage allocation problem according to users' data value, as well as different types of data, e.g., text/video/picture, according to their unique properties in cloud storage system; 2) we design an efficient storage allocation strategy based on mechanism design method, which is able to maximize the overall profits by eliminating the selfish behavior of VMs; 3) we provide non-trivial experimental studies to evaluate the performances and compare it with the analysis of the proposed strategy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries and problem formulation are presented in section II. Then in section III, we discuss the VCG based storage allocation strategy consisting algorithm and truthful bidding. The performance of the algorithm is analyzed in section IV. Section V gives experimental performance evaluation. And the paper is finally concluded in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Before the introduction of the system models and the proposed methods, we first provide the definitions of the terms and notions in Table I for future references. 
The set of quotation of storage nodes except i , ii Vbo represents the desired profits of the mechanism for participant i . Equation (1) defines the allocation rule of mechanism, which selects the maximum social benefits for society. While. (2) defines the payment rule of mechanism. The first part of which refers to the maximum benefits achieved when reusing (1) after removing participant i , and the second part presents the total benefits under the current allocation after removing participant i .
The payment rule is the core of mechanism design and the essence of VCG mechanism, which is implemented on the basis of the allocation rule. From (2), we know that the definition of each participant's payment is decided by its "externality [16] " to the mechanism. The payment is required to enforce truth-revealing effectively since only under this premise the designing and implementing of mechanism is meaningful.
When the total currency in circulation is 0, the system fulfills BB (Budget Balance). At this time, the payment of buyers is just enough to make up seller's production costs. VCG Mechanism, however, has the BU [17] (Budget Unbalance) defect, i.e., [18] analyzes the BU defect of regulatory mechanism of single-user, which points out that the benefits generated when the user access to services is measured by its own, and it is not exactly the same as real payment. For example, when a user wants to process some important confidential files immediately regardless of how much the fee is, the user gets the benefits which cannot be measured by currency. Therefore, the VCG Mechanism can be used within the single-user environment, although it has BU defect. Another important property of VCG Mechanism is that VCG Mechanism is proved to be the only real implementation under the restriction of quasilinear preferences [19] .
B. Models of Storage Node
According to the heterogeneous devices within the Cloud Storage System, the performance of each node is different, which means the providing quality of service varies. For one data storage node i , we set its property as ( , , ) We set the unit storage cost of a node i as i c , which indicates the resources consumed while the node is providing storage service to users, i.e., the prices needed to be paid. The unit storage cost of each node is related to its own property, say, ()
is a private inverse function. The explanation of inverse relationship is as following: When providing the same storage services, the better the quality of a data storage node is, the less the resources is consumed, and in this way the costs are reduced. Vise verse, if the quality of a data storage node is low, the node would find it difficult to offer the same storage services, and it would consume more resources and increase the costs.
For instance, the unit storage cost of a data storage node i c , combines with i m and forms the type of the node ( , )
c is the private information of a data storage node, meaning that except for the node itself, the information remains unknown to the system and other users. While i m is public knowledge, that is, the available storage space of each storage node can be detected by the system as well as other participants of the mechanism.
We denote ii bb i C . So either ii bc  or ii bc  . We choose several metrics such as Data Scale ( m ), requiring bandwidth ( bw ), desired processing rate ( pr ) and data type as the objects of study. The first three are described as the properties of data, and data type acts as a form of data classification (such as text, picture, video and other data types). We define the attributes for the text data as 1 We know that when we design the mechanism of multi-user to single-service ( :1 M ), the mechanism cannot activate the data storage nodes to provide services because of BU defect within the VCG mechanism, which results in its unavailability in practice. However, if the mechanism is designed for single-user to multi-service ( 1: N ), it is feasible for the mechanism to be implemented since users can choose nodes which match the quality of service (QoS) requirement.
A. VCG based Storage Allocation Algorithm
The function format of VCG Algorithm may vary according to applications, but the guiding ideology remains the same. Focusing on the objectives in this work, we can convert (1) to the following expression:
Since the total data value of a data node V v m  in (4) is a fixed value. We can further convert (4) b is the cost value that a storage node i reports to the system, and it is uncertain to be the real cost i c . Since i c is the private information of node i , which is not known by the outside, the mechanism can only implement the allocation on the basis of its quotation i b . It can be seen from (5) that the goal of allocation function is to minimize the total cost of storage system. Based on this guiding ideology, the system would prefer lower quoted nodes when allocating tasks. The lower quotation of node means the better comprehensive performances. Thus, this type of allocation is to assign tasks to high-quality nodes as more as possible.
In order to overcome the BU defect, the mechanism would follow the principle of i bv  which means the quoted cost is lower than user's estimated value while selecting the data storage nodes. Nodes that meet i bv  will be abandoned because of the high cost. Based on this principle, better performed nodes would serve more users, while the worse ones would gradually be eliminated.
We can conclude from the previous analysis, the storage tasks allocated to nodes have to meet the following conditions: 0 ( ) , ( ) The mechanism allocation is shown as in Table II and is implemented as following: 1) Select the nodes which meet i bv  as candidate nodes according to the quotation of N data storage nodes. Assuming there are n candidate nodes.
2) Arrange these n nodes in an ascending order of i b .
3) The distribution of these n nodes after ascending arrangement is:
In ( 
B. Truthful Bidding
Under the guidance of allocation function, mechanism can achieve the goal of minimum total system cost. But it is not enough just having allocation function since the quotation i b may not be equal to its true cost i c . If any competitor reveals false quotation, the real cost does not reach the minimum. As a result, mechanism has to adopt an incentive method to enforce truth-revealing. It is completed by the payment function to enforce truthrevealing within VCG mechanism design. The design idea of payment function is that the payment of a storage node is not only relevant to its own quotation, but a quantification of influence the node have on the whole system. It is a comprehensive performance of this node and the quotation of other participants, which provides a function to all service providers to restrain each other.
On the basis of (5), we make payments of n storage nodes that satisfy the condition. Converting (2) to a payment function of node i :
In which b represents the set of quotation of all participants, ,..., )
. In (7), the first part refers to the minimum cost when i is not participating in this bidding. The second part refers to the total cost of other nodes when node i participates. Note that the two parts in (7) are calculated separately under the same set of quotation b . We denote the quotation set of the remaining nodes apart from the node i as ( , ,..., , ,..., )
We know from (7) that the relationship between the quotation i b and its profit is not displayed directly. Instead, it is shown by whether the existence of node i will have an influence on other nodes in the system. To further illustrate the construction of payment function, we provide the profit expression of node i in the bidding. 1) If ii bc  , node i reports its real cost and the profit is:
From (8), we know that when node i chooses truthrevealing, the payment is actually the difference between the total system cost for whether it participates the bidding or not. Since the allocation of mechanism is ordered in an ascending way, the difference cannot be negative. Equation (8) shows that the total cost of system decreases because of the participation of node i . The positive part is converted to profit which is awarded to node i .
2) If ii bc  , when node i chooses false-revealing, the profit is:
From (9) we know that when node i chooses falserevealing, the mechanism would still convert the contribution to the system as a reward, but it is not the actual profit of node i . The profit of participants under the false quotation will be analyzed in detail in the following section.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Before analyzing our proposed VCG based Storage Allocation Strategy (VSAS), we need to make several assumptions of the characteristics of the nodes in Cloud. 
Lemma 4.1: The raising of quotation of storage nodes cannot make their profits increase
Proof: selecting one node as the study node, then any one set of quotation of storage nodes apart from i can be denoted as om  , which would have influence on the allocation of the remaining nodes. The difference between the profits achieved when false-revealing and truth-revealing of nodes is:
As to the first part of (11), when the node reveals the true cost, we can know that ik  , so ik cb  , i.e., To sum up, the profit will not increase after raising the quotation whatever situation is when the node chooses truth-revealing.
Lemma 4.2: Storage node cannot augment its profit by decreasing its quotation
Proof: selecting one node i as the study node, then any one set of quotation of storage nodes apart from i can be denoted as 
From (12) To sum up, the profit will not increase after decreasing the quotation whatever situation is when the node chooses truth-revealing. 
bb , thus the dominate strategy of the node exists, which is its truth-revealing for
ii ub -i b is not strictly larger than ( , )
ii ub -i b , the dominant strategy is weak here. But each node is conservative, when it finds that false-revealing cannot increase its profit, the node would eventually choose truth-revealing to avoid unnecessary risk. Thus the mechanism meets incentive compatibility.
Theorem 4.2:
The mechanism, for storage nodes, meets ex post individual rationality.
Proof: Theorem 4.1 points out, to all storage nodes, the truth-revealing is dominant strategy. Therefore the quotation of each node, after the gaming, fulfills
Apparently, the total cost of node i not participating the bidding is bigger than or equal to that of it does, then i u is not negative. Thus, the mechanism, for all storage nodes, meets ex post individual rationality.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

A. Parameters and Settings
According to section II which mentions the mathematical modeling of cloud storage system, the average storage cost of data storage node is:
In (13), 0i c represents the initial cost of data storage node.
,, 
In Eq. (14), ,,    respectively indicate the constant parameters of quantified storage costs, the specific value of the parameters are set as in Table III to indicate that the bandwidth is more influential in our designed cloud storage systems. For data nodes, we assume the storage data to be video data. We set 1 Therefore, as shown in Table III , the value of  is relatively larger than the rests. 
In the experiments, we select 15 data storage nodes. The initial cost is in the interval [0.001, 0.05]. The number of virtual machines is 40. The bandwidth is generated uniformly with the step length of 70 in [200, 3000] bit, and the processing speed is generated uniformly with the step length of 20 in [200, 1000] Million Instructions per Second (MIPS). We set the number of cloud tasks as 500 and the length of cloud task as 4000Million Instructions (MI). The share strategies of tasks to virtual machines and virtual machines to hosts are both time-sharing.
B. Results and Discussions
Assuming that we select node #8 as the study object, we can derive the payments and receipts when node #8 reports its real cost, raises its quotation, or lowers its quotation respectively.
As shown in Table IV , when node #8 does not participate in the bidding, it would not affect the total costs of the remaining nodes, thus the value of the first column in the table remains the same. Instead, while node #8 participates in the bidding, it may affect the total costs of the remaining nodes, thus the value of second column varies. Note: costs in the fourth column and profit in the fifth column are private information, which is only known by the node itself. Furthermore, while node #8 participates in the bidding and reveals false quotation, its profit would not be higher than that of truth-revealing. So, for conservative node, it would choose truth-revealing as the optimal quotation eventually. We can achieve the result shown in Fig. 1 when further analyzing the profit of all quotation interval of node #8. Fig. 1 , the red dots indicate the real cost of node #8, we can conclude that the profit is optimal when truth-revealing. With the quotation of node increasingly deviate from the real cost, its profit gradually deceases to 0.
On the basis of the previous detailed analysis of node #8, we implement the simulation of all nodes under the condition of real quotation and spurious quotation. To make the results representative, we divide the falserevealing into two situation, that is increasing and decreasing quotation of nodes. We choose the quotation randomly in both situations.
In Fig. 2 , to nodes #0, #2, #4, #8, #10, #11, #14, when they choose truth-revealing, they would get tasks and make some profits. When they decrease their quotations, they can definitely get the tasks, but at this time the profits of nodes would not increase. And when they increase their quotations, the experimental result shows the profits would decrease, even to 0 since they cannot get the tasks. To nodes #1, #3, #5, #6, #9, #12, #13, when they choose truth-revealing, they cannot get the tasks, the profit of which is 0. After increasing their quotation, they definitely cannot get the tasks as well. However, if these nodes intentionally decrease the price to deceive users, they can probably get the storage tasks, but the profit can be negative since its own storage cost is too high.
To sum up, all nodes, under the guidance algorithm of dominant equilibrium situation, would give up the false quotation and choose to reveal the real cost From Fig. 2 we can conclude that all nodes would achieve their optimal profit while choosing truthrevealing and the profit would not increase when they reveal the false cost. Thus to conservative storage nodes, truth-revealing is the dominant strategy. The experimental result conforms to the theoretic proof displayed in section IV.
The corresponding profits of all nodes are calculated when truth-revealing, the results as shown in Fig. 3 . The payment of the storage allocation equals to the summation of the corresponding cost and profit. As is shown in Fig. 3 (b) , the node with less cost would achieve a higher payment from mechanism since its quality is better. These nodes would have lower cost while storing the data, thus the profit is higher. On the contrary, the nodes with high cost would achieve lower payment from mechanism, they get a relatively lower profit which can even be 0. Furthermore, for all nodes participating in the bidding, when they choose truth-revealing, the profit is non-negative, which proves that the mechanism is ex post individual rationality to storage nodes. The experimental conclusion conforms to the theoretic proof in section IV. In addition, it illustrates that there are enough incentives to all storage nodes, and nodes voluntarily participate this mechanism under the driven of non-negative interests.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, a mechanism design approach is proposed for solving the storage allocation problems in cloud computing platforms. The proposed method explicitly considers individual VMs' rationality so as to thwart selfish behavior and enforce truth-revealing for selfish VMs. First, we model the cloud storage system according to its massive and heterogeneous nature. Then, a VCG mechanism based storage allocation strategy is proposed to solve the storage allocation problem on the basis of storage cost and the valuation of user data, as well as considering various aspects of performance of nodes. The proposed approach can effectively avoid the selfish behavior of cloud node and force the cloud node to truthfully bid on tasks, storage allocation is formed based on the truthful bidding according to each node's performances to maximize the profit of the cloud storage system. We provide extensive theoretical analysis and experimental studies to verify the correctness and efficiency of the proposed strategy.
The mechanism cannot activate the data storage nodes to provide services because of BU defect within the VCG mechanism when dealing with multi-user to singleservice (M: 1) problem, which results in its unavailability in practice. In our future work, we will investigated this particular problem and proposed solutions.
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